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Abstract
This paper considers a long-term relationship between two agents who both undertake an action or in-
vestment that produces a joint benefit. Agents have an opportunity to expropriate some of the joint benefit 
for their own use. Agents have quasi-linear preferences. Two cases are considered: where agents are risk 
averse but where limited liability constraints do not bind, and where agents are risk neutral and subject 
to limited liability constraints. We ask how to structure the investments and division of the surplus over 
time to avoid expropriation. In the risk-averse case, the dynamics of actions and surplus may or may not be 
monotonic depending on whether or not a first-best allocation can be sustained. Agents may underinvest but 
never overinvest. If the first-best allocation is not sustainable, there is a trade-off between risk sharing and 
surplus maximization; surplus may not be at its constrained maximum even in the long run and the “amne-
sia” property of pure risk-sharing models fails to hold. In contrast, in the risk-neutral case there may be an 
initial phase in which one agent overinvests and the other underinvests. Both actions and surplus converge 
monotonically to a stationary state, where surplus is maximized subject to the self-enforcing constraints.
© 2018 Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
This paper considers a situation where two agents repeatedly engage in joint production. In 
each period, both agents simultaneously undertake an action or investment that produces a joint 
output. Agents must also decide how to share the joint output each period. We assume there is a 
hold-up problem, that is, contracts on actions or the division of the joint output are not enforce-
able and in addition the outside option of each agent is increasing in the investment of the other 
agent. We allow joint output and the outside options of the agents to depend on an exogenous 
state. We consider cases where the agents are risk averse and where they are risk neutral. The 
only link between periods is a Markov process determining states. There is complete information: 
apart from the fact that the agents choose their actions simultaneously each period, everything 
is observable. The only friction is that contracts cannot be enforced. We consider allocations or 
contracts from which no agent has an incentive to renege by imposing self-enforcing constraints 
at each date and state. We refer to feasible contracts that satisfy these constraints as dynamic 
relational contracts. We characterize the Pareto-efficient dynamic relational contracts; we refer 
to such contracts as optimal contracts.
We impose two simplifying assumptions on our model. First, we assume that agents’ pref-
erences are quasi-linear in consumption and actions. This simplifies the problem because with 
quasi-linear preferences efficient actions (and hence, surplus) are determined independently of 
the distribution of resources (the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and the 
action is equal to unity). Second, we impose sufficient conditions such that the constrained 
Pareto-frontier is concave. This simplifies our problem because it allows us to focus on non-
random contracts.1 We examine two main cases: where agents are risk averse but preferences are 
such that non-negativity constraints on consumption can be ignored, and where agents are risk 
neutral but consumption is constrained to be non-negative (limited liability).
If agents are risk averse results depend on whether or not it is possible to sustain a first-best 
allocation for some division of the surplus. If it is possible, convergence to the first best is mono-
tone. Otherwise there might be an initial monotone phase, but in the long-run, when there are 
two or more states, monotonicity does not generally obtain: when the same state recurs, surplus 
will sometimes be higher at the later date and sometimes lower. There is also a trade-off between 
achieving efficient risk-sharing and maximizing current surplus even in the long run. In particu-
lar, and in contrast to the risk-neutral case, current surplus is not maximized. Better risk-sharing 
is achieved by holding the action of one agent inefficiently low because this reduces the outside 
option of the other agent, that is, it relaxes the latter’s self-enforcing constraint. We show that 
the optimal contract depends on the past history of states and so the “amnesia” property of the 
risk-sharing limited commitment model does not hold.
When agents are risk neutral, we consider the implications of limited liability constraints and 
show that optimal contracts involve two phases. In the first phase there is backloading with zero 
consumption for the constrained agent, who overinvests up to the last period of the backloading 
phase and the terms of the contract move monotonically in his/her favor. This overinvestment
arises because it allows a further transfer of utility to the other agent who consumes the extra 
output. It occurs despite the hold-up problem, that in a static model would lead to underinvest-
ment. Nevertheless, we demonstrate that because of backloading it is never the case that both 
1 It would be straightforward to allow for random contracts by introducing a public randomization device, but at the 
cost of considerable complexity of notation and statements of our results. Furthermore, the assumptions we make are 
consistent with those that are commonly made in the literature.
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agents overinvest—even at different dates—in any optimal contract. The second phase is station-
ary and independent of the initial conditions. Consumption and investment depend on the state 
but not on the time period. Each agent has positive consumption and, for a given state, either 
both invest efficiently or both underinvest. In either case, current surplus is maximized subject to 
the self-enforcing constraints. Convergence to the stationary phase is monotone in the sense that 
whenever the same state recurs in the backloading phase, surplus is higher at the later date.
1.1. Related literature
A number of results for special or limiting cases of this model are known. First, one-sided-
action versions of this model or variations on it, have been studied by a number of authors (see, 
e.g., Thomas and Worrall, 1994; Sigouin, 2003; Albuquerque and Hopenhayn, 2004; Kovrijnykh, 
2013). Typically, this literature has considered the case where both agents are risk neutral, there 
is limited liability and the agent taking the action can commit. To prevent the uncommitted agent 
from taking his/her outside option, actions may be kept low initially. A key insight of this liter-
ature is that incentives are improved when payments to the uncommitted agent are backloaded 
into the future. This provides a growing carrot for adhering to the contract. Consequently, the 
action or investment of the other agent can be increased in the future. This generates dynamics 
in the agent’s actions as well as in monetary payments. In the long run, actions and transfers 
converge to a stationary distribution that maximizes the surplus, output less action costs, given 
the self-enforcing constraints. The speed of backloading is restricted by the limited liability con-
straints. Ray (2002) has established the most general backloading result of this type. He considers 
a general, but non-stochastic, principal-agent model in which both parties may take actions. The 
principal can commit within each period, so the self-enforcing constraint only applies to the 
agent. He shows that an efficient contract has terms that move in favor of the agent, converging 
in finite time to the efficient self-enforcing continuation that maximizes the agent’s payoff. Our 
results generalize this backloading result to the case where both agents undertake an action and 
neither agent can commit. Furthermore, we demonstrate that there may be overinvestment in the 
risk-neutral case, and in the risk-averse case show that there may be a trade-off between produc-
tive efficiency and risk sharing even in the long run. Neither of these properties occur in models 
where only one agent takes an action.
Second, consider the case where agents have no action to take, or where there is no hold-up 
problem. In this case, the model involves sharing a stochastic endowment. The case in which 
agents have their own stochastic endowment and can share risk subject to limited commitment 
constraints has been widely studied (see, e.g., Kocherlakota, 1996; Ligon et al., 2002; Thomas 
and Worrall, 1988). A result of this pure risk-sharing case is that a constrained Pareto-efficient 
allocation evolves toward a stationary distribution, and that, for some parameter values, the distri-
bution of future expected utilities is non-degenerate. Although the distribution is non-degenerate, 
the solution exhibits an “amnesia” property that once an agent is constrained, the contract from 
then on is independent of the past history of shocks. With hold-up, the optimal contract depends 
on the past history of states and does not in general exhibit the amnesia property of the pure 
risk-sharing model.2 Furthermore, the pure risk-sharing literature only considers distributional 
issues and has no implications for the efficiency and dynamics of actions that are the focus of 
2 Ábrahám and Lacsó (2018) establish a similar result in a model of risk-sharing model and storage. The absence of 
the amnesia property is more consistent with the empirical evidence (see Broer, 2013).
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this paper. Nevertheless, we are able to demonstrate a limit result that as our hold-up problem 
vanishes, the optimal contract converges to the standard pure risk sharing contract.
Third, there are a very few papers in this limited commitment literature that examine the situ-
ation where two or more agents take actions. The most relevant paper to ours is Acemog˘lu et al. 
(2011) that considers a model of changes in political power. In Acemog˘lu et al. (2011) a Markov 
process determines which risk-averse political party is in power. Political parties take actions that 
contribute to a common pool of resources whether in power or not, but only the party in power 
gets to determine the allocation of resources across agents. Therefore, states are identified by the 
agent in power. It is shown that in a constrained Pareto-efficient allocation, the action of one of 
the agents (the one in power) is always chosen efficiently and actions of other agents (those not 
in power) are distorted downward. Furthermore, they establish a convergence result that depends 
on whether a first-best allocation is sustainable or not: if a first-best allocation is sustainable, 
then the actions and the division of resources converges to a degenerate (first-best) distribution; 
otherwise, allocations converge to a non-degenerate distribution (it need not be unique). The two-
agent model with quasi-linear utility considered in their paper corresponds to the limiting case 
of our model where in each state one agent has all the property rights. We also establish conver-
gence results but our results apply for a general distribution of property rights and an arbitrary 
number of states and may result in the actions of both agents being inefficiently low, even in 
the long run. Their convergence result, when a first-best allocation is sustainable, corresponds to 
our Theorem 1(a). In Theorem 1(b), when a first-best allocation is not sustainable, we establish 
convergence to a unique limiting distribution that is independent of initial conditions.
Fourth, our model is related to the broader literature on relational contracting (see, e.g., Levin, 
2003; Doornik, 2006; Rayo, 2007) that builds on the work of Macleod and Malcomson (1989). 
This literature has studied models with more general ingredients (including many-sided actions, 
enforceable payments, moral hazard, hidden information, and endogenous property rights), but 
has restricted attention to stationary equilibria, thus, eliminating any interesting dynamics in 
investments and transfers. The restriction to stationary equilibria is either derived, because sta-
tionary contracts are optimal (when agents are risk neutral and in the absence of limited liability), 
or imposed, because the focus is on organizational structures under which full efficiency can be 
achieved. Most of this literature is therefore silent on the dynamics of relational contracts that 
are the main concern of this paper.3
1.2. Illustrative example
To illustrate the model we have in mind, we present a simple example with no uncertainty and 
risk averse agents.4 There are two agents with common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) and an infinite 
horizon. In each discrete period the action or effort of agent i is ai and joint output is additive
3 One exception to the focus on stationary contracts is Fong and Li (2017) who introduce limited liability and moral 
hazard into a risk-neutral model firms and workers based on Levin (2003). They show that if the principal extracts most 
of the surplus, the backloading of the agent’s utility can lead to a probationary contract in which the agent’s wage is 
initially at the lower bound, and incentives are provided by the threat of termination; at some point this threat is removed 
and the wage increases to a higher level.
4 For the purpose of constructing a simple example that illustrates the solution, we here ignore the non-negativity 
constraints on consumption. We use parameter values such that the Pareto-frontier is concave. In the Supplementary 
Material, we show how to fully solve this example using our characterization results and without having to use value 
function iteration.
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y(a1, a2) = f1(a1) + f2(a2) = 2
(√
a1 + √a2
)
.
Both agents have common preferences satisfying constant absolute risk aversion with coefficient 
1/2:
ui(x) = 2
(
1 − e− 12 x
)
,
where x := c− a, consumption less effort. Actions take place simultaneously at the beginning of 
each period. At the end of the period, output is realized and it is divided between the two agents. 
Suppose, that irrespective of how output is divided, agent i can unilaterally get a breakdown 
consumption of φi(a1, a2) = θi1f1(a1) +θi2f2(a2), that depends on the action of the other agent. 
For parameters θ11 = θ22 = 0 and θ12 = θ21 = 1, this means that either agent can expropriate all 
of the other agent’s output but if they do so they lose their own output. A relational contract is 
just an agreed sequence of actions and division of the output from these actions from which no 
agent has an incentive to deviate. We assume that if a deviation occurs, in each period thereafter 
the agents revert to short-run Nash equilibrium anticipating the breakdown payoffs φi(a1, a2). 
With the specification for θij just given, the short-run Nash equilibrium has ai, ci = 0 (and hence, 
ui = 0) and the discounted payoff from a deviation, the deviation utility, is:
Di(aj ) = ui
(
2√aj
)= 2(1 − e−√aj ) .
We characterize constrained Pareto optimal contracts, that is, within the set from which no agent 
would deviate. At the first best, a∗1 = a∗2 = 1 and surplus z := y(a∗1 , a∗2) −a∗1 −a∗2 = 2 is maximal. 
This is sustainable provided an equal split of surplus (x∗i = 1) is an equilibrium:
ui(1)
(1 − δ) =
2(1 − e− 12 )
(1 − δ) ≥ Di(1) = 2(1 − e
−1),
or δ ≥ (1 + √e)−1.
Suppose that δ ≥ (1 +√e)−1, so that the first-best allocation is sustainable. Let Vi denote the 
lifetime utility of agent i. For δ > (1 + √e)−1 surplus will be constant at its efficient level for a 
range of values for V1. Consider starting from a feasible value of V1 below D1(1) = u1(2), i.e., 
worse for agent 1 than the deviation utility at the first-best allocation. If a2 = a∗2 , then agent 1 
would deviate. Therefore, a2 < a∗2 ; the best contract has a2 as high as possible, such that agent 1 
does not wish to deviate, i.e., V1 = D1(a2). Since we are assuming δ ≥ (1 + √e)−1, for the 
corresponding value of V2 on the Pareto frontier, V2 > u2(2). That is, agent 2 is unconstrained 
and a1 = 1 (is efficient). Since a2, and hence, surplus z, is determined by the binding constraint 
V1 = D1(a2), both can be expressed as functions of V1. Hence, in this example:
a1(V1) = 1,
a2(V1) =
(
1
2u
−1
1 (V1)
)2 = (log(1 − V12 ))2 ,
z(V1) = 1 + u−11 (V1) −
(
1
2u
−1
1 (V1)
)2 = 1 − 2 log(1 − V12 )− (log(1 − V12 ))2 ,
z′(V1) = u−1′1 (V1)
(
1 + u−11 (V1)
)
=
(
1 + log
(
1 − V12
))(
1 − V12
)−1
.
It is easily checked that z(V1) is increasing and concave in this region with z(0) = z′(0) = 1 and 
z(u1(2)) = 2 and z′(u1(2)) = 0. We show below (equation (4.1) in Section 4) that for values of 
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V1 where the surplus is increasing in V1, as here for V1 < u1(2), then V1 will be higher next 
period. It follows straightforwardly that V1 is an increasing sequence converging to u1(2). So, 
the contract converges to the surplus maximizing actions, here the first best. We also show below 
(see equation (3.2b) in Section 3) that surplus is divided so that u′2/u′1 is equal to the absolute 
value of the slope of the (strictly concave) Pareto frontier in the following period. Since V1 is 
increasing over time, so too is u′2/u′1.5 That is, the way the surplus is distributed (as well as V1) 
moves monotonically in favor of agent 1. Thus, backloading of agent 1’s utility occurs, and in 
such a way as to guarantee efficiency in the long-run.
The case where δ < (1 + √e)−1 is similar. There is convergence to a stationary value of V1. 
However, in this case, convergence of V1 is to a point where the actions maximize the joint 
surplus subject to the no-deviation constraints. At this value of V1, and for some neighborhood 
around it, both constraints Vi = Di(aj ) bind.
Taking both cases together, it can be concluded that with no uncertainty there is convergence 
to the constrained surplus maximizing actions for any δ.
1.3. Plan of paper
The paper extends this example to consider a more general production function and break-
down payoffs. We consider multiple states and quasi-linear preferences including risk-neutrality 
and non-negativity constraints on consumption. We show that the convergence result of the exam-
ple generalizes to the case with multiple states when the first-best is sustainable (and also when 
agents are risk-neutral), but otherwise, with risk aversion and multiple states there is a trade-off 
between risk sharing and efficiency and convergence to surplus maximization does not occur. In 
this case we show that u′2/u′1 converges to a non-degenerate limiting distribution independent of 
the initial distribution of the surplus.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 provides some gen-
eral results that apply to both the risk-neutral and risk-averse cases. Section 4 analyzes the 
risk-averse case and Section 5 the risk-neutral case. Section 6 concludes. Statements of lem-
mas and the proofs of theorems are found in Appendix A. Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas 
are relegated to the Supplementary Material.
2. Model
We consider a dynamic model of joint production where agents repeatedly undertake an action 
or investment that generates a joint output. There is no asset accumulation and full depreciation 
of the investment in each period. Once produced agents have the opportunity to unilaterally 
expropriate some of the joint output for their own benefit. In this section, we shall describe the 
economic environment and the set of dynamic relational contracts. We define a game played 
by the two agents and identify dynamic relational contracts with the subgame perfect equilibria 
of that game. Our interest is in optimal contracts, that correspond to the set of Pareto-efficient 
subgame perfect equilibria.6
5 Convergence of u′2/u′1 is to e(1 − δ(1 − e))−2 ≤ 1; convergence is to 1 for δ = (1 +
√
e)−1.
6 More precisely, we focus on efficient pure subgame-perfect equilibria relative to specified “Nash reversion” punish-
ments, although our characterization also applies mutatis mutandis to optimal punishments, should they be different, and 
hence, to efficient equilibria among the set of all pure strategy equilibria.
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2.1. Economic environment
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , ∞. At the start of each period, a state of 
nature s is realized from a finite state space S with n ≥ 1 states. The state evolves according to an 
irreducible, time homogeneous Markov chain with transition matrix [πsr], where ∑r∈S πsr = 1, 
all s ∈ S . The chain starts from an initial state s0 at date t = 0. We denote the state at date t by st
and the history of states by st = {s0, s1, . . . , st }.
There are two agents, i = 1, 2. At every date t , and after the state at that date is observed, 
both agents simultaneously choose an action/investment ai ∈ R+. Actions produce an output 
ys(a) ≥ 0 that depends on the state s and the action pair a := (a1, a2) (details are given below 
in Assumption 2). Having observed actions and output, the agents agree to split output and each 
consumes non-negative consumption ci , c := (c1, c2) ∈R2+. We impose that consumption is non-
negative as a simple way to reflect a limited liability constraint on the transfers one agent can 
make to the other. Consumption c is feasible if c1 + c2 ≤ ys(a). Agent i derives per-period utility 
ui from net consumption xi := ci − ai , x := (x1, x2) ∈ R2. We make the following assumptions 
on ui and ys :
Assumption 1. Per-period utility ui : [x i, ∞) → {−∞} ∪ R is a twice continuously differen-
tiable, strictly increasing and concave function of net consumption, where x i ≤ 0.
Assumption 2. For each s ∈ S , the production function ys :R2+ → R+ is twice continuously 
differentiable, strictly increasing in both arguments and strictly concave. Furthermore, for each 
s ∈ S , ∂2ys(a)/∂a1∂a2 ≥ 0 (complementarity); ys(0) = 0 and the upper contour sets {a ∈ R2+ |
ys(a) − a1 − a2 ≥ γ }, γ ∈R, are compact.
Assumption 2 imposes fairly standard conditions on the production function. The last part of 
Assumption 2 is a simple way to restrict actions to a compact set A(s). Denote surplus in state s
by zs(a) := ys(a) − a1 − a2. Define the first-best action pair a∗(s) as the actions that maximize 
surplus in state s. Given Assumption 2, the first-best action pair exists and is unique. We refer 
to the surplus zs(a∗(s)) as the first-best surplus. Since actions are chosen simultaneously and 
independently, we also define the conditionally efficient actions a∗i (aj , s), i, j = 1, 2, i = j , such 
that
a∗i (aj , s) := arg max
ai∈R+
[ys(a1, a2) − ai].
The conditionally efficient actions are single-valued, continuous functions of the other agent’s 
action.7 The weak complementarity assumption is slightly restrictive but reflects our view that 
relational contracting framework is most natural when there are complementarities in production. 
Given the weak complementarity assumption, conditionally efficient action functions are weakly 
upward sloping. In addition, a∗i (s) = a∗i (a∗j (s), s) for i, j = 1, 2, i = j .
We now specify what an agent can get if there is no agreement on how to divide up output. 
If no agreement is reached, agent i gets a breakdown consumption of φsi (a), and hence, a break-
down utility of ui(φsi (a) − ai). An agent can always take the option of receiving her breakdown 
7 This result is simple and straightforward to show. Formal statements of results of this type are stated as lemmas in 
Appendix A and proofs are given in the Supplementary Material. For example, the fact that conditionally efficient actions 
are single-valued and continuous is stated as Lemma 1 in Appendix A.
J.P. Thomas, T. Worrall / Journal of Economic Theory 175 (2018) 624–651 631
utility. More formally, we suppose the agents play a Nash demand game to divide output.8 In this 
Nash demand game, both agents simultaneously announce consumption claims (˜c1, ˜c2), ˜ci ≥ 0. 
If ˜c1 + c˜2 = ys(a), then this determines the division of output: consumption ci = c˜i . Otherwise, 
agents receive their breakdown consumption: ci = φsi (a).
The specific assumptions on φsi (a) are given below, but a simple example with proportional 
defaults captures what we have in mind. Suppose that each agent can, by defaulting, capture a 
fraction θi of the available output ys(a). Here, φsi (a) = θiys(a). We assume that agents cannot 
obtain more than the available output, so θ1 + θ2 ≤ 1. We do not require that the sum exhausts 
available output. For example, disagreement may incur a cost, such as lawyers’ fees or bargaining 
costs, so that some of output is lost when there is default. In such cases, θ1 + θ2 < 1. We assume 
θi > 0, so that what an agent gets in the breakdown is increasing in the action of the other agent. 
This assumption captures the hold-up feature of joint production we wish to model.
As another example, consider the special case with additive production: ys(a) = f s1 (a1) +
f s2 (a2) and suppose φ
s
i (a) = θsi1f s1 (a1) + θsi2f s2 (a2), θsij ≥ 0 and 
∑2
i=1 θsij ≤ 1, j = 1, 2 (this 
is very similar to the formulation used by Halonen (2002)). Our hold-up assumption requires 
θsij > 0, i, j = 1, 2, i = j . With this parameterization, assuming 
∑2
i=1 θsij = 1 and taking the 
limit as θsij → 0, for i, j = 1, 2, i = j and for all s ∈ S , produces the pure risk sharing model 
that has been studied by Kocherlakota (1996); Ligon et al. (2002) and others. This is discussed 
in Section 4.
Analogous to Assumption 2, we shall assume that φsi (a) satisfies:
Assumption 3. For each s ∈ S and i = 1, 2, the function φsi :R2+ → R+ is continuous, twice 
continuously differentiable, strictly increasing in both arguments and strictly concave. Moreover, 
∂2φsi (a)/∂a1∂a2 ≥ 0 (complementarity) and ∂φsi (0, aj )/∂ai > 1 for all aj ∈ R+, i, j = 1, 2, 
i = j . In addition, φsi (0, 0) = 0 for i = 1, 2 and
∂φs1(a)
∂ai
+ ∂φ
s
2(a)
∂ai
≤ ∂y
s(a)
∂ai
∀s and i = 1,2. (2.1)
In the case of proportional defaults, these conditions (apart from ∂φsi (0, aj )/∂ai > 1) follow 
directly from Assumption 2. Complementarity in Assumption 3 implies that the reaction func-
tions in the breakdown game are weakly upward sloping, and this simplifies the arguments below. 
Condition (2.1) requires that the marginal change in the total breakdown consumption from a 
change in the action of one of the agents cannot exceed the corresponding marginal product. To-
gether with φsi (0, 0) = 0, it implies that the φsi (a) are feasible, that is, φs1(a) +φs2(a) ≤ ys(a) for 
each a and s. Condition (2.1) together with ∂φsi (0, aj )/∂ai > 1, i = 1, 2 implies that the first-best 
action pair is strictly positive. The assumption that φsi is strictly increasing in both its arguments, 
in particular that ∂φsi (a)/∂aj > 0 for i = j , captures the hold-up property of the model.
Denote the Nash best-response functions (functions because φsi (a1, a2) is strictly concave in 
ai ) in the breakdown game by
aNi (aj , s) := arg max
ai∈R+
[φsi (ai, aj ) − ai].
8 This is approach is also used by Hall (2005), for example. What we want to capture is that there is an ex ante 
agreement on what actions should be taken, and how the resulting output should be split, and that failure to abide by it 
leads to the breakdown utilities. The Nash demand game is a simple way of implementing this idea – but we stress that 
our results are not sensitive to the way it is operationalized. For a fuller discussion, see Hall (2005).
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The Nash best response function aNi (aj , s) is continuous and weakly increasing in aj . Moreover, 
we have 0 < aNi (aj , s) < a
∗
i (aj , s) for each aj and every state s ∈ S . It is strictly positive because 
∂φsi (0, aj )/∂ai > 1 and is less than the conditionally efficient action because of the hold-up 
assumption that ∂φsi (a)/∂aj > 0. The best-response breakdown utility is
uNi (aj , s) := ui(φsi (aNi (aj , s), aj ) − aNi (aj , s)).
A Nash equilibrium of the breakdown game occurs where the best-response functions intersect 
(existence follows by standard arguments). Without further assumptions, the Nash equilibrium 
need not be unique (though it is unique if the defaults are proportional). However, the potential 
non-uniqueness is not critical because the Nash equilibria can be Pareto-ranked (because the 
best-response functions are non-decreasing and all Nash equilibria lie below the first-best action 
pair a∗(s)). Henceforth, we let (aNE1 (s), aNE2 (s)) denote the dominant Nash equilibrium and all 
our results apply relative to this dominant Nash equilibrium.
2.2. Dynamic relational contracts
We refer to a non-negative action and consumption sequence {a(st), c(st )}t≥0 as a plan. Cor-
responding to a plan, agent i’s lifetime utility is
Vi(s0) := E
[∑∞
t=0 δ
tui(ci(s
t ) − ai(st )) | s0
]
,
where δ is a common discount factor, 0 < δ < 1, and E denotes expectation. A plan is feasible 
if 
∑
i ci(s
t ) ≤ yst (a(st )) for every history st and ci(st ) − ai(st ) ≥ x i for i = 1, 2 and every 
history st .
A dynamic relational contract, or simply contract, is a feasible plan from which neither agent 
has an incentive to deviate. The incentive to deviate depends on the punishment for deviation. 
This is given by the breakdown payoffs in the current period (subsequent to the deviation), and 
by play of the (dominant) equilibrium of the static breakdown game in all future periods. In 
particular, suppose that a is the current recommended action pair. If agent i is to deviate at t , then 
the best she can do is to choose aNi (aj (st ), st ), which yields a current payoff u
N
i (aj (s
t ), st ).
9 She 
is punished from t+1 by “Nash reversion” in which both agents choose their best responses in 
the breakdown game, that is, both will thereafter play the (dominant) Nash equilibrium of the 
breakdown game described above.10
Let Dsi (aj ) denote the deviation utility: the best discounted payoff that agent i can get by 
deviating, given agent j ’s putative action aj in state s. It is defined recursively by
Dsi (aj ) := uNi (aj , s) + δ
∑
r∈S πsrD
r
i (a
NE
j (r)),
where Dri (a
NE
j (r)) is the deviation utility from the play of the Nash equilibrium in state r . Given 
our hold-up assumption (see Assumption 3), it follows that the deviation utility is continuous, 
differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave in the action of the other agent.
9 Deviation at the output division stage cannot be preferable since breakdown is triggered in either case, and ai may 
not be optimal in the breakdown.
10 A dynamic relational contract is equivalent to a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium relative to future reversion 
to this Nash equilibrium. Here, strategies are infinite sequences of history-dependent actions and consumption claims. 
Punishment consisting of immediate triggering of the breakdown, and repeated play of the (dominant) Nash equilibrium 
of the breakdown game thereafter, is subgame perfect (each agent just demands the whole output after any deviation (i.e., 
off the equilibrium path), triggering the breakdown game each period).
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We stress that replacing the Nash reversion punishments by any state dependent continuation 
utilities that are no greater than the Nash reversion punishments leaves all the characterization 
results we derive intact. In particular, optimal punishments satisfy this property. Equally, if agents 
can take state-dependent outside options at the start of any period, then, provided these outside 
options satisfy the condition that they are no greater than the Nash reversion punishments, all 
our results apply. For example, if in periods after a default the breakdown consumptions/utilities 
were lower than they are in an on-going relationship, then our results still hold.
Since an agent can always take the option of receiving her breakdown utility, the deviation 
utility provides a lower bound (as a function of the other agent’s action) on the discounted utility 
an agent gets in any dynamic relational contract . Hence, {a(st), c(st )}∞t=0 is a dynamic relational 
contract if it is feasible and if for every st , and i, j = 1, 2, i = j ,
Vi(s
t ) := ui(ci(st ) − ai(st )) +E
[∑∞
τ=t+1 δ
τ−t ui(ci(sτ ) − ai(sτ )) | st
]
≥ Dsti (aj (st )).
(2.2)
The continuation utility Vi(st ) is the discounted utility that agent i anticipates from the contract 
after the history st . The right hand side of (2.2) is the deviation utility agent i gets from devi-
ating from the recommended action after the history st . We refer to the inequalities (2.2) as the 
self-enforcing constraints. Whenever (2.2) holds with equality, we say that agent i is constrained. 
Otherwise, we say that agent i is unconstrained.
Dynamic relational contracts exist. For example, the trivial contract that has ai(st ) = aNEi (st )
and ci(st ) = φsti (aNE(st )) for all st is both feasible and self-enforcing and therefore a dynamic 
relational contract. We show below (see Proposition 2) that there exist other non-trivial dy-
namic relational contracts.11 Corresponding to any dynamic relational contract, {a(st ), c(st )}∞t=0, 
and initial state s0, is a pair of lifetime utilities (V1(s0), V2(s0)). Given the set of dynamic 
relational contracts, let Vs0 denote the set of the corresponding lifetime utilities. Our objec-
tive is to characterize contracts corresponding to the Pareto-frontier of the set Vs0 . We refer 
to dynamic relational contracts that correspond to this Pareto-frontier as optimal contracts
and refer to the corresponding actions as optimal actions. We say that agent i underinvests
(or that the action is inefficiently low) at some date t in an optimal contract if the optimal 
actions are such that ai(st ) < a∗i (aj , s) and say the agent overinvests (or the action is inef-
ficiently high) if ai(st ) > a∗i (aj , s). Given the stochastic history st , we can treat an optimal 
contract as a stochastic process for (a, c). We will be interested in the long-run behavior of 
this process and whether it converges, and if so, whether convergence is dependent on s0 or 
V1(s0).
3. Preliminary results
This section establishes some preliminary results on the Pareto-frontier of the set of dynamic 
relational contracts and optimal actions. Section 4 considers the case where agents are risk averse 
and Section 5 will consider the case where agents are risk neutral.
11 Intuitively, hold-up creates an inefficiency and provided δ > 0, repeated game arguments allow cooperation to im-
prove on the breakdown Nash equilibrium.
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3.1. Relationship to the Nash actions
Proposition 1. In any optimal contract (i) actions are never below the Nash reaction functions, 
ai(s
t ) ≥ aNi (aj (st ), st ), and a(st ) ≥ aNE(st ) > 0 for all st ; (ii) an agent who is allocated all 
current output and who is not overinvesting (i.e., ai(st ) ≤ a∗i (aj (st ), st )), is unconstrained.
The intuition for (i) is that if the action of one of the agents, say agent 1, were below the Nash 
reaction function, a Pareto improvement could be found by increasing the action of agent 1 by a 
small amount. Although the deviation utility of agent 2 increases (by hold-up), his consumption 
can be increased to prevent a violation of his self-enforcing constraint, and there is sufficient extra 
output remaining to more than compensate agent 1 for the increase in her action. This property 
then implies that actions can never be below the Nash equilibrium actions, a(st) ≥ aNE(st ). 
Since it can be shown that the Nash equilibrium actions are strictly positive, aNi (aj , s) > 0, it 
follows that optimal actions are always positive too. Although (ii) is not trivial, it is unsurprising. 
Suppose, say, that agent 1 is allocated all of the current output. Then, agent 1 is receiving more 
of output than she would obtain in the breakdown game, if she held her action constant (because, 
by Assumption 3, agent 2 can claim a positive share of output in the breakdown game). In a 
deviation, agent 1 will optimize her action, but since she is not overinvesting, reducing her action 
to the Nash reaction function will only reduce output net of her effort. Hence, she would be worse 
off than receiving all output at the higher action. The continuation utility cannot be lower than the 
deviation continuation utility, so a deviation will lead to output being shared and a punishment 
continuation, worse than the equilibrium path and thus, agent 1 could not be constrained. In fact, 
we shall show later (see the discussion after the first-order conditions (3.2a)–(3.2c)) that any 
agent with positive consumption will not overinvest, and therefore the caveat in Proposition 1(ii) 
about an agent who is not overinvesting can be dispensed with.
3.2. Concavity, continuity and differentiability
We define V s2 (V1) to be the Pareto-frontier of the set Vs . It is not necessarily concave; in 
particular the concavity of the deviation utility Dj(ai) in the action of the other agent implies 
that the self-enforcing constraints (2.2) may not be satisfied at average actions and hence the 
constraint set need not be convex. Nevertheless, the Pareto-frontier can be shown to be concave 
under some additional restrictions. We state and discuss two alternative sufficient conditions for 
concavity in Appendix A, Assumption A4 and Assumption A5.
Proposition 2. For each s ∈ S (i) under either Assumption A4 or Assumption A5, V s2 (V1) is a 
continuous and concave function of V1 defined on a non-degenerate closed interval [V s1 , V¯ s1 ], 
and is continuously differentiable on its interior. Moreover,
V
s(+)
2 (V1) = 0 and V s(−)2 (V¯1) = −∞,
where V s(+)2 denotes the right and V
s(−)
2 the left derivative. (ii) Under Assumption A4, V s2 (V1)
is strictly concave if ui is strictly concave, i = 1, 2, or over any interval such that as(V1) varies 
with V1; under Assumption A5, V s2 (V1) is strictly concave over any interval such that as(V1)
varies with V1.
We use Assumption A4 in Section 4 that considers the case where agents are risk averse. It 
requires two things: the first is essentially that the curvature of the deviation utility is less than the 
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curvature of surplus as a function of actions. The second is that an optimal contract has xi > 0, 
i = 1, 2 at every date. The latter follows, for example, for utility functions (such as those with 
constant relative risk aversion with coefficient of risk aversion greater than or equal to one) where 
limx→0 u(x) = −∞. We use Assumption A5 in Section 5 that considers the case where agents 
are risk neutral. It requires that the production function is more concave than the corresponding 
deviation utility. It is satisfied in many reasonable examples and Assumption A5 is a generalized 
version of the condition given in Thomas and Worrall (1994).
In the one-sided action case where only one agent undertakes an action, it is known that the 
value function can fail to be differentiable (Thomas and Worrall, 1994). It is perhaps surprising, 
then, that in this two-sided case we are able to establish differentiability. The key observation is 
that since optimal actions are positive, it is possible to vary both actions simultaneously, holding 
the future utilities constant, so as to vary V1 whilst satisfying the self-enforcing and feasibility 
constraints.
3.3. Recursive formulation
We now use a recursive programming approach to examine optimal contracts. It is useful to 
work with net consumption xi as a choice variable instead of consumption ci . The Markov as-
sumption on the evolution of states and the infinite time horizon, together with the observation 
that all the self-enforcing constraints are forward looking, means that the set of continuation utili-
ties corresponding to a dynamic relational contract depends only on the state r and is independent 
of the past history. V s2 (V1) is characterized as follows:
Proposition 3. V s2 (V1), V1 ∈ [V s1 , V¯ s1 ], is a solution to the following program
V s2 (V1) = max
a≥0,x≥x ,(V r1 ∈R)r∈S
{
u2(x2) + δ
∑
r∈S πsrV
r
2 (V
r
1 )
}
subject to
[P1]
u1(x1) + δ
∑
r∈S πsrV
r
1 ≥ V1: λ (3.1a)
V1 ≥ Ds1 (a2) : μ1 (3.1b)
u2(x2) + δ
∑
r∈S πsrV
r
2 (V
r
1 ) ≥ Ds2 (a1) : μ2 (3.1c)
V r1 ≥V r1 : δπsrνr1 (3.1d)
V r1 ≤ V¯ r1 : δπsrνr2 (3.1e)
xi + ai ≥ 0 : i, j = 1,2, i = j γi (3.1f)
x1 + x2 ≤ zs(a1, a2): ψ (3.1g)
The non-negative Lagrangian multipliers are indicated after each inequality. The expected 
discounted utility V1 of agent 1 (in state s) is the state variable in this programming problem. 
The value function V s2 (V1) represents the Pareto-frontier of the set of dynamic relational con-
tracts in the space of continuation utilities. It describes how the maximum continuation utility 
to agent 2 changes as the continuation utility of agent 1 is changed. The inequality (3.1a) is the 
promise-keeping constraint that requires that the contract delivers at least the current discounted 
utility. The inequalities (3.1b) and (3.1c) are the self-enforcing constraints corresponding to the 
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inequalities given in (2.2). The constraints (3.1d) and (3.1e) reflect that the continuation util-
ity for agent 1 in state r must lie in the interval [V r1 , V¯ r1 ]. Inequalities (3.1f) and (3.1g) are the 
feasibility constraints.
We denote a solution to [P1] by (as(V1), xs(V1)) and continuation utilities (V s,r1 (V1)). It 
can be shown that as(V1) is unique; however, xs(V1) and V s,r1 (V1) need not be. Corresponding 
to this solution, and abusing notation, we define the surplus zs(V1) := zs(as1(V1), as2(V1)). We 
discuss the properties of zs(V1) below, but we refer to the maximal value of zs(V1) for V1 ∈
[V s1 , V¯ s1 ] as the constrained maximal surplus and the actions that maximize this surplus as the 
constrained surplus-maximizing (CSM) actions. Let a¯(s) denote the CSM action in state s.12
If the CSM actions are equal to the first-best actions a¯(s) = a∗(s) (and hence the constrained 
maximal surplus equals the first-best surplus), then we say that the first-best is sustainable in 
state s. We denote the set of states in which the first-best actions are sustainable as S∗ ⊆ S and 
denote its complement by Sc∗ (it is possible that S∗ = ∅ or Sc∗ = ∅). A first-best allocation (FBA) 
will involve the first best actions, a∗(s), in each state and date and complete risk-sharing (that is, 
net consumption x∗(s) with x∗1 (s) +x∗2 (s) = zs(a∗(s)) such that u′2(x∗2 (s))/u′1(x∗1 (s)) is constant 
over all states and dates).
An optimal contract is computed recursively. Start from some given initial value for agent 1’s 
lifetime utility, V1(s0) in state s0. The solution to the programming problem provides optimal 
values for a(s0) and x(s0) in state s0 by setting V1 = V1(s0) in [P1]. The solution also determines 
the continuation utilities for V s0,r1 (V1(s0)) in each possible subsequent state r . At date t = 1 and 
history s1 = (s0, s1), the value for V1 is determined by the solution for the continuation utility 
at date t = 0 for the appropriate state and the solution to the date t = 1 programme determines 
a(s1) and x(s1). The process is repeated to determine {a(st ), x(st )}∞t=0. Doing this for each 
V1(s0) ∈ [V s01 , V¯ s01 ] determines the set of optimal contracts.
3.4. First-order conditions
From Proposition 2 the Pareto-frontier is continuously differentiable and the range of absolute 
slopes of the frontier is R+ ∪ {∞}. Let σs(V1) := −V s′2 (V1) and σ+s,r (V1) := −V r ′2 (V s,r1 (V1))
be the (absolute) slopes of the Pareto-frontiers, where σs : [V s1, V¯ s1 ] → R+ ∪ {∞} is strictly 
increasing since the Pareto-frontier is strictly concave. The envelope condition for [P1] is 
−σs(V1) = −λ + μ1. Using this condition, differentiating with respect to xi , ai and V r in [P1], 
and rearranging gives the first-order conditions:
σ+s,r (V1) − σs(V1) = −σs(V1)
μ2
1 + μ2 +
μ1
1 + μ2 +
νr1 − νr2
1 + μ2 (3.2a)
σ+s,r (V1) =
u′2(·)
u′1(·)
+ γ2 − γ1
u′1(·)(1 + μ2)
+ ν
r
1 − νr2
1 + μ2 (3.2b)
μj
1 + μ2
dDsj
dai
= ∂z
s
∂ai
(
u′2(·) +
γ2
1 + μ2
)
+ γi
1 + μ2 i, j = 1,2 and i = j. (3.2c)
12 In principle, there may be dynamic relational contracts in which there are actions that achieve a higher surplus but at 
the cost of lower future surplus. Our definition considers only optimal contracts. However, in both the risk-neutral and 
risk-averse cases that we consider below, the two concepts coincide and the CSM actions do maximize zs(d1, d2) subject 
to the self-enforcing constraints. It will also be shown below that in the cases we consider, the CSM actions are unique.
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Since the range of absolute slopes of the frontier is R+ ∪ {∞}, it is intuitive that σ+s,r (V1) is the 
same for each future state r ∈ S . To see this first suppose that νr1 > 0. In this case V s,r1 (V1) =V r1 , 
σ+s,r (V1) = 0 and by a complementary slackness condition νr2 = 0. Then using equation (3.2a), −σs(V1) − μ1 = νr1 > 0 which gives a contradiction since σs(V1) and μ1 are non-negative. 
A similar argument can be made to show that νr2 = 0. Since νri = 0, it follows from (3.2a) that 
σ+s,r (V1) is independent of r and we write σ+s (V1) for this common future value. This property 
greatly simplifies the dynamics of the contracting problem.
It follows directly from the first-order conditions (3.2c) that in an optimal contract (i) there is 
only ever underinvestment, ai(st ) < a∗i (aj (st ), s), if at least one of the agents is constrained; and 
(ii) if agent i has positive consumption, then he/she does not overinvest, ai(st ) ≤ a∗i (aj (st ), s). 
To see the intuition for the first part, suppose that agent 1 is unconstrained. If agent 2 were under-
investing, he could increase investment and generate more surplus. The surplus would be enough 
to compensate him for the extra investment and agent 1 won’t default because she is uncon-
strained. Thus, it would be possible to find a better contract, yielding a contradiction. Similarly, 
to see the second part, suppose that agent 1 is overinvesting. Then she could reduce her invest-
ment. This relaxes agent 2’s self-enforcing constraint (keeping consumptions now and future 
promises the same). However, output has fallen, so aggregate consumption must fall. If agent 1 
has positive consumption, it is possible to keep the consumption of agent 2 the same, while 
the utility of agent 1 increases because she has cut her investment from above the conditionally 
efficient level.
There is also a simple corollary to these results: a) both agents cannot be overinvesting 
(because one agent must have positive consumption); b) an agent cannot be permanently overin-
vesting because consumption must be positive at some future date – otherwise the self-enforcing 
constraint would not be satisfied.
4. Risk aversion
For this section we assume that agents are risk averse: we strengthen Assumption 1 and as-
sume that ui is strictly concave for i = 1, 2, and use Assumption A4 from Appendix A. In 
particular, it is assumed that net consumption and hence, consumption is strictly positive in 
an optimal contract. It will follow from this that overinvestment is not a feature of an optimal 
contract. The allocation of net consumption between agents may vary, potentially considerably, 
across states even in the long-run. Thus, it is important to examine how allowing for risk aversion 
affects optimal contracts.
4.1. Characterization of optimal contracts
In this sub-section, we consider some properties of the optimal contract and surplus as V1
varies in a given state, and how the contract is updated period-by-period: in particular, how the 
ratio of marginal utilities changes from one period to the next. In the following sub-section, 
we consider the long-run properties of the optimal contract showing that it evolves towards a 
stationary distribution and study when this stationary distribution does or does not depend on the 
value of agent 1’s lifetime utility V1(s0).
Proposition 4. With risk-averse agents and under Assumption A4 (i) there is no overinvest-
ment, ∂zs(a(st ))/∂ai ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, all st ; (ii) surplus zs(V1) is a concave differentiable function 
(strictly concave if s ∈ Sc∗) with maximum at unique CSM actions; (iii) at V1 such that zs(V1)
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Fig. 1. Surplus Function zs(V1).
is maximized, if s ∈ Sc∗ both constraints bind and as(V1) < a∗(s), and if s ∈ S∗ efficient actions 
a∗(s) are sustainable by definition; (iv) for each V1 ∈ [V s1 , V¯ s1 ], σ+s (V1), the (absolute value 
of the) common slope of the Pareto-frontiers next period, and σs(V1), the slope of the current 
Pareto-frontier, satisfy
σ+s (V1) − σs(V1) = u′2
(
xs2(V1)
) dzs(V1)
dV1
. (4.1)
The intuition for (i) was discussed above in Section 3.4 when ci > 0 for i = 1, 2. Properties 
(ii) and (iii) are illustrated in Fig. 1.13 Equation (4.1) in part (iv) is fundamental to understanding 
the dynamics of an optimal contract. It is easy to interpret. Consider a (small) unit increase in V1. 
The effect on agent 2’s discounted utility is to change it by approximately V s ′2 (V1) = −σs(V1)
units. One way to effect this change (as good as any other at the optimum) is to hold the current 
utility of agent 1 constant (giving any change in the current surplus to agent 2) and increase V r1
in each state r , the next-period continuation utilities of agent 1, by 1/δ. The effect on agent 2’s 
current utility is u′2(x
s
2(V1)) × (dzs(V1)/dV1). The effect on the discounted continuation utility 
of agent 2 is to decrease it by σ+s (V1), the same for all future states. The combined effect for 
agent 2 is u′2(x
s
2(V1)) × (dzs(V1)/dV1) − σ+s (V1). Since the overall change in utility for agent 2 
is −σs(V1), we can equate to get equation (4.1).
The implication for the dynamics of optimal contracts is illustrated in Fig. 1. Consider starting 
from a value of V1 below the level that maximizes surplus. In this region, agent 1’s constraint 
binds (Ds1(as2(V1)) = V1) and a2 is kept inefficiently low (as2(V1) < a∗2(as1(V1), s)) to prevent 
agent 1 from deviating. In this region, V2 may be high enough to allow a1 to be conditionally ef-
ficient (as1(V1) = a∗1(as2(V1), s)) without violating agent 2’s constraint, but if s ∈ Sc∗ , then, closer 
13 Where χ¯ s1 and χ
s
1 are the values for V1 such that agent 1’s constraint binds for V1 ≤ χ¯ s1 , while agent 2’s constraint 
binds for V1 ≥ χs1; surplus is maximized at χˆ s1 in case (b). See the Supplementary Material for further details. Note 
that both constraints bind for values of V1 ∈ (χs1, χ¯ s1 ) in Fig. 1b. This contrasts with pure risk-sharing models with 
limited commitment, for example, Kocherlakota (1996) or Thomas and Worrall (1988), where at most one self-enforcing 
constraint binds at any one time in any non-trivial optimum.
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to the surplus maximizing value of V1, both constraints will bind and a1 will be inefficiently low. 
Also, in this region, dzs(V1)/dV1 > 0, so equation (4.1) implies that σ+s (V1) > σs(V1). In par-
ticular, if there is a single state or if the same state recurs, the change in V1 is as indicated by the 
arrows in Fig. 1. In this case, surplus will be higher next period as the increase in V1 allows the 
extent of agent 2’s underinvestment to be reduced, and by enough to offset any increase in un-
derinvestment by agent 1. (We discuss the implications when states switch below.) A symmetric 
argument applies to the dynamics for high values of V1.
4.2. Long-run dynamics
To examine long-run convergence, we treat choices at date t as random variables and write 
x1(t) for the random value of net consumption of agent 1 at date t after history st etc. Define 
ρ(t) := u′2(x2(t))/u′1(x1(t)) to be the ratio of marginal utilities at date t (ρ(t) = σ(t+1)). In this 
subsection we focus on the long-run properties of ρ(t).
With more than one state, convergence to constrained surplus maximization may not occur 
because there is a conflict between risk sharing and surplus maximization. To achieve surplus 
maximization in state s, the distribution of consumption may differ from that in s′ = s and there-
fore, an optimal contract must (dynamically) trade-off risk sharing against surplus maximization.
As already described, there is a (possibly trivial) interval of marginal utility ratios correspond-
ing to maximum surplus in any state s. Let [ρs, ρ¯s] denote this interval in state s.14 By equation 
(4.1), the marginal utility ratio is unchanged from the previous period if (and only if) surplus 
is maximized today (i.e., ρ(t) ∈ [ρst , ρ¯st ]). Thus, a constant marginal utility ratio requires that 
 := ∩s∈S [ρs, ρ¯s] = ∅. The set  is non-empty when an FBA is sustainable, in which case the 
ratio is constant. If  is not only non-empty but a non-trivial interval, then there are multiple 
FBAs. Moreover, if an FBA is sustainable, then monotone convergence to an FBA occurs. If 
however,  is empty, or if CSM actions are not always efficient, an FBA is not sustainable and 
the marginal utility ratio may not converge to a single value. Nevertheless, under a weak regu-
larity condition, it does converge to a unique long-run invariant distribution, independent of the 
initial conditions.
To describe the evolution of the marginal utility ratio, let F (V1(s0))t :R+ → [0, 1] denote the 
distribution function of ρ(t) at date t given the initial value V1(s0). This leads us to the following 
general convergence theorem.15
Theorem 1. (a) Suppose an FBA is sustainable. Then an optimal contract converges with prob-
ability one to an FBA: ||a(t) − a∗(st )|| → 0 and the random sequence {ρ(t)} is (weakly) mono-
tone, with probability one. If there exist multiple FBAs, then the limit FBA depends upon V1(s0).
(b) Suppose instead that an FBA is not sustainable. Then, provided πss > 0 for all s, F (V1(s0))t
converges weakly to a unique distribution independent of V1(s0). Either (i) this distribution is 
degenerate, in which case dynamics are as in part (a), with stationary limit contract with CSM 
actions a¯(s) in each state, or otherwise (ii) this distribution is non-degenerate, and current sur-
plus is not maximized in the long run: ||a(t) − a¯(st )|| → 0 with probability zero.
In part (a) of Theorem 1, there is convergence to an FBA. There is a (possibly trivial) interval 
of the ratio of marginal utilities given by the set  that are compatible with efficient actions 
14 For s ∈ S∗, ρs = σs(χ¯s1 ) and ρ¯s = σs(χs1) and for s ∈ Sc∗ , ρs = ρ¯s = σs(χˆs1 ) (see Fig. 1).
15 We use ||·|| to denote the Euclidean norm.
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and a constant marginal utility ratio. Convergence will be to the lower endpoint of  if the 
initial marginal utility ratio is below the interval; to the upper endpoint of  if initial marginal 
utility ratio is above the interval; and the sequence of marginal utility ratios will be constant 
if the initial marginal utility ratio belongs to . The dynamics are similar in Part (b)(i), which 
considers the case where there is a marginal utility ratio consistent with CSM actions in each 
state. Convergence is to the CSM actions and to this (unique marginal utility) ratio. This case 
arises if there is a single state but CSM actions are not efficient.16 If there are multiple states and 
CSM actions in each state are inefficient, then this case is possible but not generic in the sense 
that a small perturbation of either φsi or ys in any state s will lead to the case of Part (b)(ii).
Part (b)(ii) of Theorem 1 provides a description of what happens when there is a conflict 
between surplus maximization and risk sharing. The optimal contract exhibits a second-best 
property. The marginal utility ratio ρ(t) does not settle down to a single value, and whenever 
it differs across two dates t−1 and t , actions at date t will not be CSM.17 By contrast, in the 
risk-neutral case, we show that once the stationary phase is reached surplus is maximized in each 
state by varying the continuation utility to allow the constrained maximal surplus to be achieved 
(Theorem 2). For example, if the state changes from one in which agent 1 can claim most of 
output to one in which roles are reversed, sufficient surplus and future utility is reallocated to 
agent 2 to satisfy his self-enforcing constraint at the CSM actions for that state. However, in the 
risk-averse setting of part (b)(ii) of Theorem 1, risk-sharing considerations make such an imme-
diate step change undesirable. It is better to hold agent 1’s action at the later date inefficiently low, 
keeping agent 2’s default payoff from rising too much, thereby relaxes the latter’s self-enforcing 
constraint meaning that the share going to agent 2 does not rise to that consistent with the CSM 
actions.
To better understand this dynamic trade-off between surplus maximization and risk sharing 
suppose to the contrary that the ratio of marginal utilities differs across two dates t−1 and t , 
but actions at date t are CSM. Then a simple change in the contract at t−1 and t can produce a 
Pareto-improvement. Consider the case where ρ(t−1) >ρ(t). Initially hold actions fixed at both 
dates and increase x1(t) by a small amount, but reduce x1(t−1) to leave V1(t−1) unchanged. If 
surplus were unchanged at t , this would improve risk sharing and lead to a Pareto-improvement 
because V2(t−1) would increase. However, because x2(t), and hence V2(t), have fallen, agent 2’s 
self-enforcing constraint may be violated at the initial actions (and will be, if the CSM actions 
are below the first-best). In order not to violate agent 2’s self-enforcing constraint, agent 1’s ac-
tion at date t can be reduced. Correspondingly, agent 2’s action can be increased because V1(t)
has risen. Critically, although this change may reduce surplus at date t , it does so only by a 
second-order amount since, by assumption, the original actions at date t were CSM.18 Con-
sequently, a Pareto-improvement results, contradicting the supposed optimality of the original 
situation.
16 For the single state case irrespective of whether s ∈ S∗ or not, {ρ(t)} monotone implies {zs (t)} is monotone increas-
ing, converging to constrained maximal surplus, as indicated by the arrows in Fig. 1.
17 Formally, ρ(t−1) = ρ(t) corresponds to σ(t) = σ(t+1), and thus, from (4.1), dzst (V1(t))/dV1 = 0. Hence, actions 
at date t are not CSM, as claimed.
18 The change in surplus would be second order when V1 and V2 are varied according to the Pareto frontier at t starting 
from maximum surplus; because the frontier’s slope is −ρ(t) at maximum surplus, the change we construct also only 
has a second-order effect. Also, note that, by construction, the self-enforcing constraints hold at t , and since V1(t−1) is 
unchanged and V2(t−1) is increased, they also hold at t−1.
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4.3. Pure risk-sharing
We now compare our results to the standard limited commitment, two-agent, pure risk-sharing 
model of Thomas and Worrall (1988); Kocherlakota (1996); Ligon et al. (2002). To do this, for 
simplicity we consider a special case of our hold-up model with additive production, ys(a) =
f s1 (a1) +f s2 (a2), and proportional defaults, φsi (a) = θsi1f s1 (a1) + θsi2f s2 (a2) where θsij ≥ 0, i, j =
1, 2, and 
∑2
i=1 θsij = 1, j = 1, 2. Our hold-up assumption requires θsij > 0, i, j = 1, 2, i = j , all 
s. Holding technology and preferences fixed, consider the limit case where hold-up vanishes: 
θsij = 0, i, j = 1, 2, i = j , all s. This corresponds to the pure-risk sharing model. In any optimal 
contract of this limit model actions are clearly efficient, as are actions in the breakdown, so 
only efficient levels play any role. Agent i’s “endowment” in state s is f si (a
∗
i (s)) − a∗i (s) and 
breakdown utility is u(f si (a
∗
i (s)) − a∗i (s)).
We establish that the dynamics of the hold-up model converge to that of the risk-sharing 
model. In the latter, as is well known, dynamics are summarized in a simple updating rule for 
ρ(t) (which fixes surplus division given surplus depends only on s). We characterize how the 
corresponding updating rule in the hold-up model converges to the risk-sharing one as hold-up 
disappears. One application of this is that it allows us to characterize general properties of the 
hold-up dynamics for cases where hold-up is low.
From Ligon et al. (2002), the updating rule in the pure risk-sharing case, which we write 
ρ(t) = hRS(ρ(t−1), st ), has the property that there is a (possibly degenerate) interval [ρRSs , ρ¯RSs ]
for each s such that hRS(ρ(t −1), s) = ρ¯RSs if ρ(t −1) > ρ¯RSs ; hRS(ρ(t −1), s) = ρ(t −1) if 
ρ(t−1) ∈ [ρRSs , ρ¯RSs ] and hRS(ρ(t−1), s) = ρRSs if ρ(t−1) < ρRSs . Moreover, whenever optimal 
contracts that improve on autarky exist (if there is more than one distinct state, and δ is close 
enough to 1), each [ρRSs , ρ¯RSs ] is non-degenerate (Proposition 2(iv) in Ligon et al., 2002).
Likewise, in the hold-up model we can also use (ρ(t − 1), st ) as the state variable. (By 
ρ(t−1) = σ(t), this is equivalent to (σ (t), st ).) Thus, the evolution of the contract can be rep-
resented by ρ(t) = h(ρ(t−1), st ), where h:R+ ∪ {∞} × S → R+ (see Appendix A for details 
and characterization). The updating functions h(ρ, s) converge to those of the pure risk-sharing 
model as the hold-up problem diminishes. Moreover, for ρ(t−1) within the interior of the inter-
val [ρRSst , ρ¯RSst ], when hold-up is small enough, optimal actions at t are at the first-best levels and 
so ρ(t) = ρ(t−1). An illustration of this convergence for two states is depicted in Fig. 2.19
Proposition 5. For each state s ∈ S , (i) for all ρ ∈ R+, h(ρ, s) → hRS(ρ, s) as θij → 0, i, j =
1, 2, i = j , all s. (ii) If optimal contracts in the risk-sharing problem improve upon autarky, then 
for any η satisfying (1/2)(ρ¯RSs − ρRSs ) > η > 0, all s, there exists  > 0 such that for θsij < , 
i, j = 1, 2, i = j , all s, h(ρ, s) = ρ for all ρ ∈ [ρRSs + η, ρ¯RSs − η].
One well-known feature of the pure risk sharing model is the “amnesia” property that once one 
of the agents is constrained, then the previous history is irrelevant to the future evolution of the 
optimal contract. This property no longer applies in our model of risk averse agents with actions. 
Suppose that agent 2’s self-enforcing constraint binds at date t . In the risk-sharing problem, this 
19 Fig. 2 is drawn with hRS(ρ, s) and h(ρ, s) coinciding along the 45◦ line. This is for illustration only. Close to the 
limit as hold-up vanishes it is approximately true that the lines hRS(ρ, s) and h(ρ, s) are coincident along the 45◦ line, 
except near the end-points of the segment of hRS(ρ, s) that lies on the 45◦ line. In general, we have no result on how the 
intersections of hRS(ρ, s) and h(ρ, s) with the 45◦ line are related.
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Fig. 2. Convergence to Pure Risk-Sharing.
fixes his continuation utility and there is a unique optimal way of delivering this continuation 
utility independently of past history and, in particular, independently of the previous ratio of 
marginal utilities. This can be seen in the flat sections of the functions hRS(ρ, s) in Fig. 2. In 
the hold-up problem, by contrast, agent 2’s self-enforcing constraint can be relaxed by cutting 
agent 1’s action. Although this change may reduce surplus, sacrificing surplus can be offset by 
improved risk sharing and the incentive to do this will vary with the lagged marginal utility ratio. 
The logic of trading off surplus to improve risk sharing is similar to the explanation given above 
for why the partial insurance case involves optimal actions that are not CSM, even in the long 
run. This result is illustrated in Fig. 2 by the fact that the functions h(ρ, s) are upward sloping 
even away from the 45◦ line. Thus, even when an agent is constrained, past history affects the 
current actions and consumption and the future evolution of the optimal contract. The amnesia 
property fails.
5. Risk neutrality
For this section, we use Assumption A5 and suppose that both agents are risk neutral, in par-
ticular, that ui(x) = x and that x i = −∞ for i = 1, 2. In this case, the non-negativity constraint 
on consumption (limited liability) plays a key role. We show that an optimal contract exhibits a 
two-stage property. It starts with a backloading phase in which one of the agents consumes all of 
the output. This agent never overinvests, while the other agent overinvests. The second phase is 
stationary and actions are CSM. Therefore, if s ∈ S∗, actions are at the first-best for both agents. 
If s ∈ Sc∗ , both agents underinvest and have positive consumption. Depending on the initial di-
vision of surplus however, the optimal contract might start off in the stationary phase in which 
case the first backloading phase does not exist.
The lower bound for the deviation utility is strictly positive. Therefore, the Pareto-frontier is 
defined on s := [V s1, V¯ s1 ] ⊂R++. It can be shown that the frontier is strictly concave if at least 
one of the self-enforcing constraints is binding. If V1 is in an interval where the efficient actions 
are sustainable (such values may not exist), then the frontier is linear with slope of −1 in this 
interval. In either case, CSM actions are unique.
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Consider three (not necessarily disjoint) subsets of s : As = {V1 ∈ s : co1 = 0}, Bs = {V1 ∈
s : co1 > 0 and co2 > 0} and Cs = {V1 ∈ s : co2 = 0} where (co1, co2) represents an optimal value 
for consumption at V1. Note that As ∪ Bs ∪ Cs = s . Also note that As can be non-empty and 
Cs empty or vice-versa (examples of this type can be constructed). We know from our previous 
discussion that if agent 1 overinvests, this can only occur for V1 ∈ As , and if agent 2 overinvests, 
this occurs for V1 ∈ Cs . Also, since optimal actions are positive, output and aggregate consump-
tion is positive, and consequently, it is not possible that both γi > 0 for the same V1. Equally, 
for V1 ∈ As , c2 > 0, and hence, the multiplier γ2 = 0.20 We also know from Proposition 1 that if 
c1 = 0, and therefore, that agent 2 gets all the consumption, then agent 2 is unconstrained, and 
hence, μ2 = 0. Likewise, for V1 ∈ Cs , γ1 = μ1 = 0. Consumption for both agents is positive for 
V1 ∈ Bs , so that γ1 = γ2 = 0.
Consider the subset As . Using γ2 = μ2 = 0, we have from the first-order conditions (3.2a)–
(3.2c) that:
σ+s (V1) = 1 − γ1 =
∂ys(a1, a2)
∂a1
, (5.1a)
σs(V1) = 1 − γ1 − μ1 = ∂y
s(a1, a2)
∂a1
− ∂z
s(a1, a2)
∂a2
(dDs1
da2
)−1
. (5.1b)
Hence, for V1 ∈ As , 1 ≥ σ+s (V1) ≥ σs(V1). From equation (5.1a) it follows that if σ+s,r (V1) < 1, 
then γ1 > 0, and ∂ys(a1, a2)/∂a1 < 1, so that agent 1 is overinvesting. From equation (5.1b)
it follows that agent 2 doesn’t overinvest and may underinvest. A similar set of conditions 
apply for V1 ∈ Cs and imply 1 ≤ σ+s (V1) ≤ σs(V1) so that agent 1 doesn’t overinvest and 
if σ+s (V1) > 1, then agent 2 overinvests. For V1 ∈ Bs , the first-order conditions show that 
σ+s (V1) = 1, so there is no overinvestment. As a measure of the extent of overinvestment let 
ζ si := max{0, −ln(∂ys(a1, a2)/∂a1)} and ζ s := max{ζ s1 , ζ s2 }. Hence, ζ s > 0 if there is overin-
vestment and is a measure of the distortion of the marginal product below the efficient level.21
We now state our two-phase characterization theorem. Here, for convenience, we also treat 
contracts as sequences of random variables, writing ai(t) rather than ai(st ) etc.
Theorem 2. In an optimal contract, there is a random time tˆ , 0 ≤ tˆ < ∞ with probability one, 
such that:
Stationary phase (t ≥ tˆ ): Optimal actions maximize the surplus zs(a1, a2) subject to the 
self-enforcing constraints, and hence, are CSM. The optimal actions depend only on the 
state st and are therefore independent of the initial conditions. There is no overinvestment: 
ai(t) ≤ a∗i (aj (t), st ) for i, j = 1, 2, i = j . For st ∈ S∗, therefore, optimal actions and the cor-
responding surplus are first best: a(t) = a∗(st ) and zst (a(t)) = zst (a∗(st )). For st ∈ Sc∗ , the 
self-enforcing constraints bind for both agents, ci > 0 for i = 1, 2, and there is underinvestment: 
ai(t) < a
∗
i (aj (t), st ) ≤ a∗i (st ) for i, j = 1, 2, i = j .
Backloading phase (t < tˆ ): Overinvestment declines during the backloading phase: in partic-
ular, ζ(t) is weakly decreasing with ζ(tˆ−1) = 0. Backloading only applies to one agent, i, whose 
identity depends on the initial surplus split: this agent overinvests and has zero consumption 
20 Since the multiplier is unique, the conclusion that γ2 = 0 is valid even if V1 also belongs to Bs or to Cs . The same 
argument can be made for the other subsets and multipliers.
21 In subset As , ζ s = − lnσ+s (V1) and in subset Cs , ζ s = lnσ+s (V1).
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at each t < tˆ −1. In the final period of backloading, at date tˆ − 1, there is no overinvest-
ment: ai(tˆ −1) ≤ a∗i (stˆ−1), but aj (tˆ −1) < a∗j (stˆ−1) for j = i. Moreover, if at any two dates 
t and t ′ > t the same state s occurs, then underinvestment diminishes and surplus increases: 
∂ys(a(t))/∂aj ≥ ∂ys(a(t ′))/∂aj ≥ 1 for tˆ − 1 ≥ t ′ > t and zs(a(t ′)) ≥ zs(a(t)) for tˆ ≥ t ′ > t .
For a given value of agent 1’s lifetime utility V1(s0), there corresponds a value σ0. From Theo-
rem 2, we can describe a typical path as follows. Suppose σ0 < 1 (a symmetric argument applies 
if σ0 > 1). Then one of two possible scenarios applies. Either V1(s0) ∈ Bs0 or V1(s0) ∈ As0 . In 
the former case, tˆ = 1 and the contract moves to the stationary phase in each state at the next 
period. There is no overinvestment in this case. In the latter case, either ζ1(0) = 0 and tˆ = 1 as 
in the previous case, or ζ1(0) > 0 in which case tˆ > 1 and there is a backloading phase in which 
c1(t) = 0 and agent 1 overinvests. Correspondingly, V1 is sufficiently low that agent 1’s self-
enforcing constraint binds and agent 2 underinvests to avoid violating agent 1’s self-enforcing 
constraint; by contrast V2 is high enough that agent 2’s self-enforcing constraint is slack.22 The 
basic intuition for the backloading result is familiar from other dynamic contracting models. The 
claim is that if agent 2 is unconstrained and underinvesting, then agent 1 has zero consumption 
at all previous dates, her payments are optimally backloaded into the future. The idea is that if 
agent 1 has positive consumption, then backloading her consumption allows her later constraints 
to be relaxed, which in turn means agent 2 can increase his future investment level without vi-
olating agent 1’s constraint. Since agents are risk neutral they do not care about the timing of 
consumption flows (keeping the action plans fixed) if the expected discounted value is the same, 
but the backloading will permit future surplus to be increased, leading to a Pareto-improvement. 
Consumption is backloaded to the maximum extent possible, c1(t) = 0 throughout the phase, 
allowing maximum surplus to be achieved as quickly as possible. Furthermore, by increasing 
a1(t) above a∗1(a2(t), s), with the extra output being allocated to agent 2, additional backloading 
can be achieved, and for a small amount of overinvestment, the reduction in surplus is second-
order.23 Two novel results in the two-sided environment concerning the backloading phase are 
the over-investment by the agent whose utility is backloaded (although over-investment does not 
persist into the stationary phase), and the fact that despite the possibility that property rights 
might vary radically and persistently between states, only one of the agents will ever be subject 
to backloading.
That there is overinvestment in the backloading phase is perhaps surprising given the hold-
up problem and given that the literature, mentioned in the Introduction, that considers the case 
where only one agent takes an action finds that there is never any overinvestment. Consider the 
one-sided case with only agent 1 taking an action. If agent 2 gets sufficient of the surplus to 
allow a1 to be more than a∗1 without agent 2 wanting to deviate, then the optimal contract will 
be stationary with a1 = a∗1 . The benefit from overinvestment is that it allows more backload-
ing of agent 1’s utility when c1 = 0. In this case however there is no benefit, but an efficiency 
22 This characterization applies so long as ζ1(t) > 0 and assuming agent 1’s self-enforcing constraint binds with a 
positive multiplier. With more than one state, we cannot rule out the possibility that in some states deviation utilities are 
so low that the self-enforcing constraints may not bind even when σ(t) < 1. In this latter case, from (3.2c) and (3.2a), 
a2(t) = a∗2 (a1(t), s) and σ+(t) = σ(t).
23 The incentive to overinvest diminishes over time (as can be seen from (5.1a), σ+(t) approaches 1). Equally, if the 
same state recurs along the path, underinvestment diminishes as the self-enforcing constraint is relaxed. The combined 
effect is that surplus zs (a(t)) increases, and reaches a maximum when σ(t) = 1.
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cost, and backloading can only increase agent 2’s incentive to renege in the future, potentially 
necessitating lower (inefficient) future actions by agent 1. Thus, there is no overinvestment.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the dynamic properties of a relational contract between two 
agents both of whom undertake a costly investment or action that yields joint benefits. We have 
shown that optimal contracts exhibit different properties depending on whether agents are risk 
neutral or risk averse. In the risk-neutral case, actions may be either above or below the efficient 
level and actions and the division of the surplus converge monotonically to a stationary solution at 
which actions are constrained surplus maximizing (either both are first-best or both are below the 
first-best level). In the risk-averse case, we also establish a convergence result but convergence 
may or may not be monotonic depending on whether it is possible to sustain a first-best allocation 
or not. We have demonstrated that the optimal contract converges to the pure-risk sharing results 
of Kocherlakota (1996) as our hold-up problem vanishes.
In the risk-averse case there is an interesting trade-off between hold-up and risk-sharing. The 
hold-up problem creates an opportunity to relax the default constraint by lowering actions. This 
in turn allows more risk-sharing to be achieved without leading to default. It would be interesting 
to evaluate whether the gain in risk-sharing would ever be sufficient to offset the loss in surplus 
created by the original hold-up problem. This is a difficult question because without additional 
structure to the model little can be said about the long run distribution of the optimal contract.
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Appendix A
A.1. Statements of lemmas for Section 2
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 2, for i, j = 1, 2, i = j and for each s ∈ S , the conditionally 
efficient action, a∗i (aj , s), is single-valued, weakly increasing and continuous in aj .
Lemma 2. Under Assumption 3, for i, j = 1, 2, i = j and for each s ∈ S , the Nash best-response, 
aNi (aj , s), is single-valued, weakly increasing and continuous in aj . Moreover, 0 < a
N
i (aj , s) <
a∗i (aj , s) for all aj .
Lemma 3. Under Assumptions 1 and 3, for i, j = 1, 2, i = j and for each s ∈ S , the deviation 
utility, Dsi (aj ), is bounded below and is a continuous, increasing, strictly concave, and differen-
tiable function of aj .
A.2. Statements of lemmas and technical details for Section 3
Lemma 4. Under Assumptions 1–3, the set of lifetime utilities Vs0 that correspond to dynamic 
relational contracts is compact for each s0 ∈ S . Hence, optimal contracts exist.
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It is convenient in analyzing the recursive problem to change variables and use the deviation 
utilities of the two agents instead of actions. Let dj := Dsi (aj ); by Lemma 3 dDsi (aj )/daj > 0, 
and we let gsi (dj ) := (Dsi )−1(dj ). Abusing notation, surplus is zs(d1, d2) := zs(gs2(d1), gs1(d2)), 
with output ys(d1, d2) defined similarly. Given the properties of Dsi (aj ) (Lemma 3), the 
functions gsj (di) are continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex. Let 
D(s) := {(d1, d2) = (Ds2(a1), Ds1(a2)) | (a1, a2) ∈ R2+}. The contract {d(st ), x(st )}∞t=0 is feasi-
ble if 
∑
i xi(s
t ) ≤ zst (d(st )) (total consumption does not exceed output) for every history st , 
and for actions and consumption to be non-negative, it must also satisfy d(st ) ∈ D(st ) for ev-
ery history st and xi(st ) + gstj (di(st )) ≥ 0 for i, j = 1, 2, i = j and every history st . We define 
d∗i (s) = Dsj (a∗i (s)), i = j , d∗i (dj , s) = Dsj (a∗i (gsi (dj ), s)), etc.
Problem [P1] can be reformulated with d ∈ D(s) replacing a ≥ 0 as a choice variable, the 
RHS of (3.1b) and (3.1c) being d2 and d1 respectively, ai in (3.1f) being gsj (di) and the RHS of 
(3.1g) being zs(d1, d2), with solution denoted by (ds(V1), xs(V1)).24
With the change in variables, the first-order condition (3.2c) becomes
μj
1 + μ2 =
∂zs
∂di
(
u′2(·) +
γ2
1 + μ2
)
+ gs ′j (di)
γi
1 + μ2 i, j = 1,2 and i = j. (A.1)
To establish concavity of V r2 (·) we give two alternative assumptions.
Assumption A4. (a) zs(d):D(s) → R is strictly concave in d and (b) any solution to [P1] has 
xi > 0 for i = 1, 2 and for each st .
Assumption A5. The function zs(d) + gsj (di) :D(s) → R+ is concave in d for each i, j = 1, 2, 
j = i.
Under either Assumption A4 or Assumption A5, the Pareto-frontier is concave on [V s1 , V¯ s1 ]
(Proposition 2(i)). Under Assumption A4, it is easily checked that the constraint set is also con-
vex.25
Although Assumptions A4 and A5 are not directly on primitives of the model (because they 
are specified in terms of the deviation utility and an endogenous variable for Assumption A4), it is 
easily checked that there are natural parameterizations of the model where these assumptions are 
satisfied. For example, Assumption A4 is satisfied provided that agents are not too risk averse. 
For example, consider the case where preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion with 
coefficient α > 0, the same for both agents, and the production function is separable and given 
by ys(a1, a2) = (β)−1((a1)β + (a2)β) where β ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, suppose each agent can 
24 The linear independence constraint qualification holds unless the constraints (3.1f) are inactive and 
u′2(∂zs/∂a1)(dgs2(d1)/dd10 = 1. This constraint qualification can fail, but it only fails at V1 = V¯ s1 where the slope 
of the Pareto-frontier is infinite (examples where the constraint qualification fails at this point can be constructed). Thus, 
apart from V1 = V¯ s1 , the linear independence constraint qualification holds and the Lagrangian multipliers in the first-
order conditions (reported in sub-section 3.4) exist and are unique. We can also ignore points V1 = V¯ s1 without loss of 
generality: if V1(s0) < V¯
s0
1 , then we will show that V1 = V¯ s1 for any state s; if V1(s0) = V¯
s0
1 , then it will be possi-
ble to reformulate the problem maximizing the utility of agent 1 for a given V2 for agent 2 and the relevant constraint 
qualification will be satisfied.
25 It can also be checked that if [P1] is written with c and d as choice variables, then a sufficient condition for convexity 
of the constraint set is that ys (d) is concave in d . This condition is more stringent than concavity of zs (d) and will fail 
in a number of natural cases.
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expropriate a proportion θ of output in the case of default. Then a sufficient condition for the 
assumption to be satisfied for θ ∈ (1/e, 1/2] is if α < −eθ(1 − θ)−1 log θ , and for θ ∈ (0, 1/e]
if α < (1 − θ)−1. Equally, suppose that agents are risk neutral with ui(x) = x, production is 
additive and the breakdown consumption in each state is φi(a) = θi1f1(a1) + θi2f2(a2), where 
for notational simplicity the dependence of θ , f etc. on s is suppressed. With this specification 
for φi(a), D′′j /D′j = f ′′i /f ′i , and it can be checked that Assumption A5 is satisfied.
Lemma 5. Under Assumptions 1–3 and under either Assumption A4 or Assumption A5, dsi (V1)
is a continuous function of V1 for each s ∈ S and i = 1, 2.
Lemma 6. Under Assumptions 1–3, and for i, j = 1, 2, i = j , for any history st , (i) if Vi(st ) >
dj (s
t ), then aj (st ) ≥ a∗j (ai(st ), st ); (ii) if ci(st ) > 0, then ai(st ) ≤ a∗i (aj (st ), st ).
A.3. Statement of lemmas and proofs of theorem for Section 4
For all lemmas and proofs in this subsection, we maintain Assumption A4. Additionally it is 
assumed that agents are risk averse, that is, ui is strictly concave for i = 1, 2.
Lemma 7. For each s ∈ S , a solution to [P1] has the property that zs(a1, a2) is maximized over 
a ∈R2+ subject to V1 ≥ Ds1(a2) and V s2 (V1) ≥ Ds2(a1).
Lemma 8. For each s ∈ S , the surplus function zs(V1) is continuous, concave and differentiable 
in V1.
Lemma 9. For each s ∈ S , (i) dzs(V1)/dV1 > 0 (< 0) implies μs1(V1) > 0 (μs2(V1) > 0); (ii) 
there are two critical values χ¯ s1 ∈ (V s1, V¯ s1 ] and χs1 ∈ [V s1, V¯ s1 ), such that ds2(V1) = V1 for all 
V1 ≤ χ¯ s1 and ds1(V1) = V s2 (V1) for all V1 ≥ χs1. Moreover, μs1(V1) = 0 for V¯ s1 > V1 ≥ χ¯ s1 and 
μs2(V1) = 0 for V s1 < V1 ≤ χs1 (if such V1 exist). If the efficient actions can be sustained in state s, 
then χ¯ s1 ≤ χs1. Otherwise, χ¯ s1 > χs1, and surplus is maximized for a unique value of V1 ∈ (χs1, χ¯ s1)
at which both constraints bind.
Proof of Theorem 1:
Before proving the theorem, we prove two lemmas.
Since σ+s (V1) depends only on the current slope σ and the current state s (recall V1 and σ are 
uniquely related for a given state) the evolution of the contract can be represented as a stochastic 
recursion, i.e., σ(t +1) = σ+st (σ−1st (σ )), which we write as σ(t +1) = h(σ (t), st ), and where 
h:R+ ∪ {∞} × S → R+; σ(0) = σ0 is the given initial value, corresponding to the initial state 
s0 and agent 1’s lifetime utility V1(s0). (This is the same function as h defined in the text, given 
that ρ(t) = σ(t+1).)
Lemma 10. (i) The function h(σ, s) is continuous and strictly increasing in σ ; (ii) for each state 
s, there is a single, possibly degenerate, interval of fixed points [σ ∗s , σ¯ ∗s ], σ ∗s > 0, such that 
h(σ, s) = σ for any σ ∈ [σ ∗s , σ¯ ∗s ]; (iii) h(σ, s) < σ for σ > σ¯ ∗s and h(σ, s) > σ for σ < σ ∗s .
Proof. Let xi(V1) = ci(V1) − gj (di(V1)) be the net consumption of agent i (dropping the state 
superscript) and ρ(V1) := u′2(x2(V1))/u′1(x1(V1)). Then, h(σ, s) = ρ(σ−1s (σ )).
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We first prove part (i). From the concavity properties of [P1] under Assumption A4, the choice 
variables xi(V1) are continuous, and hence, ρ(V1) is continuous in V1. From Proposition 2(i), 
the Pareto-frontier is continuously differentiable and hence, so too is its inverse. Thus, h(σ, s) is 
continuous in σ .
Next, we turn to the monotonicity of h(σ, s). First, we show that ρ(V1) is strictly in-
creasing. Suppose, to the contrary, that ρ(V1) ≤ ρ(V˜1) for some V1 > V˜1. It follows from 
ρ(V1) = −V r ′2 (V1) and the concavity of the frontier V r2 (V1) that V r1 (V1) ≤ V r1 (V˜1) for 
all r ∈ S . Also, since V˜1 < V1, we have u1(x1(V˜1)) + δ∑r∈S πsrV r1 (V˜1) < u1(x1(V1)) +
δ
∑
r∈S πsrV r1 (V1). Hence, x1(V˜1) < x1(V1). Likewise, since the frontier is downward sloping, 
V2(V˜1) > V2(V1) and V r2 (V
r
1 (V˜1)) ≤ V r2 (V r1 (V1)), and therefore, that x2(V˜1) > x2(V1). But then 
u′2(x2(V˜1))/u′1(x1(V˜1)) < u′2(x2(V1))/u′1(x1(V1)) or ρ(V˜1) < ρ(V1), which is a contradiction. 
Thus, we can conclude that ρ(V1) is strictly increasing in V1. Since the frontier V s2 (V1) is strictly 
decreasing in V1 and σ = −V s′2 (V1), the result is proved.
To establish parts (ii) and (iii), from Lemma 9, for s ∈ S∗, surplus is at the first-best level 
for V1 ∈ [χ¯ s1 , χs1]. Correspondingly, there is an interval of Pareto frontier slopes [σ ∗s , σ¯ ∗s ] :=
[−V s′2 (χ¯ s1 ), −V s′2 (χs1)]. For s ∈ Sc∗ , the corresponding interval is degenerate at a single point 
[σ ∗s , σ¯ ∗s ] := [−V s′2 (χˆ s1)] where χˆ s1 = arg maxV1 zs(V1). It follows from part (b) of Assumption A4
and equation (3.2b) (given γi = νri = 0 for i = 1, 2) that σ+s (V1) is positive and finite. Thus, 
0 < σ ∗s ≤ σ¯ ∗s < ∞. Equation (4.1) therefore implies the following: If σs(V1) ∈ [σ ∗s , σ¯ ∗s ], then 
σ+s (V1) = σs(V1). If σs(V1) > σ¯ ∗s , then dzs(V1)/dV1 < 0 (given the concavity of zs(V1) by 
Lemma 8) and hence, σ+s (V1) < σs(V1). Likewise, if σs(V1) < σ ∗s , then dzs(V1)/dV1 > 0 and 
hence, σ+s (V1) > σs(V1). 
Let s¯ be a state such that σ ∗¯s ≥ σ ∗s and s a state such that σ¯ ∗s ≤ σ¯ ∗s for all s ∈ S .
Lemma 11. An FBA is sustainable if and only if σ ∗¯s ≤ σ¯ ∗s and S∗ = S .
Proof. The “if” implication follows because there would exist an initial value σ0 ∈ [σ ∗¯s , σ¯ ∗s ] such 
that σ0 ∈ [σ ∗s , σ¯ ∗s ] for each state s. It therefore follows that starting from σ0, σ(t), and hence, 
the ratio of marginal utilities, is kept constant at σ0 and since surplus is maximized for σ(t) ∈
[σ ∗st , σ¯ ∗st ], actions are CSM and thus first-best by S∗ = S in each state. “Only if” follows because 
by Lemma 10 even if first-best actions are sustainable in every state, σ ∗¯s > σ¯ ∗s would imply 
that whenever st = s¯ and sτ = s (such t , τ exist with probability one given irreducibility), then 
either (a) σ(t) ∈ [σ ∗st , σ¯ ∗st ] and σ(τ) ∈ [σ ∗sτ , σ¯ ∗sτ ] in which case σ(t) > σ(τ), and the risk-sharing 
condition fails, or (b) either or both σ(t) /∈ [σ ∗st , σ¯ ∗st ] and σ(τ) /∈ [σ ∗sτ , σ¯ ∗sτ ], in which case surplus 
is not maximized at least one of the dates. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Recalling that ρ(t) = σ(t+1), an interval [σ ∗s , σ¯ ∗s ] corresponds to an in-
terval of marginal utility ratios in state s and convergence of σ(t) is equivalent to convergence of 
ρ(t). Part (a) of the Theorem therefore follows straightforwardly from Lemmas 10 and 11. From 
Lemma 11 σ ∗¯s ≤ σ¯ ∗s . Convergence is to σ ∗¯s if σ0 < σ ∗¯s , since σ(t) = h(σ (t−1), st−1) ≥ σ(t−1)
by Lemma 10 (iii) and so {σ(t)} is a non-decreasing sequence; it is bounded above by σ ∗¯s given 
h continuous and increasing in σ and that h(σ, s) ≤ σ , all s, for σ ≥ σ ∗¯s , by Lemma 10 (ii) 
and (iii); with probability one σ(t) converges to σ ∗¯s given that h(σ, ¯s) > σ for σ < σ ∗¯s and the 
irreducibility of [πsr ] and finiteness of states implies that state s¯ is recurrent. Likewise con-
vergence (monotonic) is to σ¯ ∗s if σ0 > σ¯ ∗s , and σ(t) is constant at σ0 if σ0 ∈ [σ ∗¯s , σ¯ ∗s ]. If there 
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exist multiple FBAs then σ ∗¯s < σ¯ ∗s , and the limit depends on σ0 and hence on V1(s0). Since 
limt→∞ σ(t) ∈ [σ ∗s , σ¯ ∗s ] for all s, ρ(t) converges and by continuity the limit actions are a∗(st ), 
and x∗(st ) is such that u′2(x∗2 (s))/u′1(x∗1 (s)) = limt→∞ σ(t), all s.
For (b), if an FBA is not sustainable, then by Lemma 11 either σ ∗¯s = σ¯ ∗s and the CSM actions 
are below first-best levels in at least one state, or σ ∗¯s > σ¯ ∗s . In the former case by Lemma 10, 
following the argument in part (a), {σ(t)} is monotonic and converges with probability one to 
σ ∗¯s = σ¯ ∗s ∈ [σ ∗s , σ¯ ∗s ] for all s, implying that limiting actions are CSM in each state, establish-
ing case (b)(i). Otherwise, part (b)(ii) obtains; σ(t) ∈ [mins{h(0, s)}, maxs{h(∞, s)}] for t ≥ 1. 
Irreducibility and finiteness of [πsr ] implies s and s¯ are recurrent, and σ ∗¯s > σ¯ ∗s implies that 
for any σ ≥ 0, either h(σ, ¯s) > σ or h(σ, s ) < σ (or both). Thus, given h is continuous in σ , 
weak convergence to a degenerate distribution is impossible. Next consider the sequence of r.v.s 
{a(t) − a¯(st )}. Assume w.l.o.g. that state s is uniquely defined. Consider an infinite history 
{s0, s1, . . .} in which each state occurs infinitely often, which implies from the properties of h
established in Lemma 10 that there exists t ′ such that σ(t) ≥ σ¯ ∗s for t ≥ t ′; note that the set of 
such histories has probability one. Suppose that a(t) − a¯(st ) → 0, so that along the subsequence 
{st1 , st2, st3 , . . .} where ti is the ith time s occurs, a(ti) → a¯(s ) as i → ∞. Consider a t ≥ t ′
such that st = s¯. Then σ(t) ≥ h(σ¯ ∗s , ¯s) > σ¯ ∗s by h increasing in σ and h(σ, ¯s) > σ for σ < σ ∗¯s . 
If ti is the next time s occurs, σ(ti) ≥ min{h(σ¯ ∗s , ¯s), mins =s σ¯ ∗s } > σ¯ ∗s . This implies that V1(ti)
is bounded above arg maxV1 zs (V1), i.e., above σ−1s (σ¯ ∗s ), so a(ti) is bounded away from a¯(s ). 
Since st = s¯ infinitely often, this contradicts a(ti) → a¯(s ). Next, fix any σc ∈ (σ¯ ∗s , σ ∗¯s ); clearly 
h(σc, ¯s) > σc and h(σc, s ) < σc. Using πss > 0 all s, there exist t ≥ 1 such that
ε1 := P(σ (t) < σc| σ0 = (max
s
{h(∞, s)})) > 0
ε2 := P(σ (t) > σc| σ0 = (min
s
{h(0, s)}) > 0,
since for ε1 (respectively ε2) consider a sufficient number of consecutive occurrences of s
(respectively s¯). This implies the “splitting condition” of Bhattacharya and Majumdar (2007, 
Chapter 3.5, p. 250) for the i.i.d. case, and the condition in Foss et al. (2018, Corollary 1) in 
the general Markov case. Thus, there is a unique stationary distribution F˜ such that F (V (s0))t
converges weakly to F˜ , as t → ∞, for any initial condition. 
A.4. Statement of lemmas and proof of theorem for Section 5
For this subsection we maintain Assumption A5 but additionally assume that agents are risk-
neutral with ui(xi) = xi .
Lemma 12. For each s ∈ S , the Pareto-frontier V s2 (·) is strictly concave on [V s1,V s∗1 ) where 
V s∗1 := inf{V1:V s′2 (V1) = −1}, and on (V¯ s∗1 , V¯ s1 ] where V¯ s∗1 := sup{V1:V s′2 (V1) = −1}. If first-
best actions are not sustainable in state s, i.e., for s ∈ Sc∗ , then V s2 (·) is strictly concave on 
[V s1, V¯ s1 ].
Lemma 13. With probability one, there is a random time tˆ < ∞ such that ζ(t) converges mono-
tonically to 0 with ζ(t) = 0 for all t ≥ tˆ − 1.
Lemma 14. For each s ∈ S , the surplus function zs(V1) is a continuous and single peaked 
function of V1. That is, for any V (1)1 < V (2)1 < V (3)1 , it is not possible that zs(V (1)1 ), zs(V (3)1 ) >
zs(V
(2)
1 ). Moreover, z
s(V1) is maximal when σs(V1) = 1.
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Proof of Theorem 2. Stationary phase: Define tˆ as the earliest date at which σ(t) = 1. By 
Lemma 13, tˆ < ∞ with probability 1. If σ = 1 and V1 ∈ A (so that c1 = 0), then it fol-
lows from the first-order conditions that γ1 = γ2 = μ1 = μ2 = 0, and hence that a(t) = a∗(st )
or equivalently d(t) = d∗(st ) (we suppress t below for notational simplicity). A similar ar-
gument applies for σ = 1 and V1 ∈ C. If σ = 1 and V1 ∈ B (so c1 > 0 and c2 > 0), then 
μ1 = μ2 from (3.2a). Thus, either μi = 0, i = 1, 2, in which case again d = d∗ and zs(d)
is maximal, or μi > 0, i = 1, 2, so both self-enforcing constraints bind. In the latter case, 
(∂zs/∂d2)/(∂zs/∂d1) = 1 = −V s′2 (V1), from (3.2a) and (A.1). From the concavity of V s2 (V1)
and zs(d), this implies that zs(d) is maximized by choice of d ∈D(s) and V1 ∈ [V s1, V¯ s1 ] subject 
to d2 ≤ V1, d1 ≤ V2(V1). Since these self-enforcing constraints must hold for any dynamic rela-
tional contract, it follows that at σ = 1, zs(d) is maximal across all dynamic relational contracts 
whether the self-enforcing constraints bind or not and optimal actions are CSM. Also in the case 
where μ1 = μ2 > 0, it follows from (A.1) that di < d∗i (dj , s) ≤ d∗i (s), j = i (the last inequality 
follows because d∗i (dj , s) is non-decreasing in dj ). Since ai and di are positively monotonically 
related through the function gsj and a = a∗ if and only if d = d∗, the statement in the Theorem 
follows.
Backloading phase: Suppose V1(s0) is such that σ0 < 1 (a symmetric argument applies if 
σ0 > 1). Then σ(t) ≤ σ+(t) ≡ σ(t+1) ≤ 1 and γ2(t) = 0.
We first establish the last part of the theorem. Consider t = tˆ−1, so that σ+(t) ≡ σ(t+1) = 1. 
Then σ+(t) − σ(t) > 0 and from (3.2a), μ1(t) > 0. (3.2b) implies that γ1(t) = 0. So from (A.1), 
∂zst /∂d1 ≥ 0, and thus, d1(t) ≤ d∗1 (d2(t), st ). Likewise in (A.1), d2(t) < d∗2 (d1(t), st ). Together 
with d1(t) ≤ d∗1 (d2(t), st ) this implies d1(t) ≤ d∗1 (st ) and d2(t) < d∗2 (st ); equivalently a1(t) ≤
a∗1(st ) and a2(t) < a∗2(st ).
Next, suppose σ+(t) < 1, so that t < tˆ−1 and from (5.1a) γ1 > 0 (so c1 = 0 and V1(t) ∈ Ast ). 
Equation (5.1a) implies that ∂ys(a1, a2)/∂a1 < 1, so that a1(t) > a∗1(a2(t), st ). Again us-
ing (A.1), ∂zs(d1, d2)/∂d2 ≥ 0, so that d2(t) ≤ d∗2 (d1(t), st ) and hence a2(t) ≤ a∗2(a1(t), st ).
To establish the monotonicity of the marginal conditions, consider dates t and t ′ with tˆ ≥ t ′ > t
such that the same state s occurs at date t and t ′. If σ+(t ′) < 1, then it follows from the mono-
tonicity of the sequence established in Lemma 13 that σ+(t) ≤ σ+(t ′) < 1. Hence, V1(t) ∈ Ast
and V1(t ′) ∈ Ast ′ . It follows directly from (5.1a) that 1 > ∂ys(a(t ′))/∂a1 ≥ ∂ys(a(t))/∂a1. 
Now suppose, contrary to the assertion that ∂ys(a(t ′))/∂a2 > ∂ys(a(t))/∂a2 or equiva-
lently ∂zs(a(t ′))/∂a2 > ∂zs(a(t))/∂a2. From (5.1a) and (5.1b) ∂zs(a(t))/∂a2(dDs1/da2)−1 ≡
∂zs(d(t))/∂d2 = σ+(t) − σ(t) ≥ 0, and hence ∂zs(a(t))/∂a2 ≥ 0 and ∂zs(a(t ′))/∂a2 > 0. Strict 
concavity of zs(a) requires that 
∑2
i=1((∂zs(a(t ′)/∂ai) − (∂zs(a(t)/∂ai))(ai(t ′) − ai(t)) < 0 for 
a(t) = a(t ′). Then, since ∂2zs/∂a1∂a2 ≥ 0, it follows that a1(t) ≥ a1(t ′) and a2(t) > a2(t ′). 
This however provides a contradiction. To see this, consider that σ(t ′) ≥ σ(t) and σ(t) < 1 im-
ply, from Lemma 12, that V1(t ′) ≥ V1(t). Equally, because ∂zs(a(t ′))/∂a2 > 0, μ1(t ′) > 0, and 
hence, d2(t ′) = V1(t ′) ≥ V1(t) ≥ d2(t). This implies a2(t ′) ≥ a2(t), a contradiction. A similar 
argument applies if σ+(t) < σ+(t ′) = 1 except that in this case we have γ1(t ′) = γ2(t ′) = 0 and 
thus, from (A.1), ∂zs(a(t ′))/∂a1 ≥ 0 > ∂zs(a(t))/∂a1 (the second inequality follows from the 
earlier argument because σ+(t) < 1). Finally, Lemma 14 shows that zs(V1) is continuous and 
single-peaked and has a maximum when σs(V1) = 1. From above, V1(t ′) ≥ V1(t) when σ(t) < 1. 
Hence, we conclude that zs(a(t)) ≤ zs(a(t ′)). 
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Appendix B. Supplementary material
Supplementary material related to this article can be found online at https://doi .org /10 .1016 /
j .jet .2018 .02 .004.
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